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INTRODUCTION
Today software license agreements are universal.1 Almost
every functioning modern company licenses software, either as
vendor or user, to help run the business. Even after the technology
industry downturn, many technology companies base their
business model on licensing out their technology.2 These licenses
are typically sophisticated contracts with ongoing obligations for
both parties: service, support, and upgrade responsibilities on the
part of the licensor, and confidentiality requirements and copyright
and use restrictions on the part of the licensee.3
In addition to basic contract law that applies to the actual
software license, software vendors also rely on trade secrets
doctrine and copyright law to protect their products.4 However,
despite updates in intellectual property law to accommodate the
challenges software presents,5 licenses are still the predominant
method for transferring software rights from one party to another.6
One reason for the prevalence of software licenses in the industry
is that it permits software companies the control they need in a
rapidly changing technical environment, without waiting for the
law to catch up.7 For example, licensing permits the vendor to
restrict the licensee’s right to use software in ways not allowed in

1

See Viktoria L. Gres, Rejection of Computer Software Licensing Agreements in
Bankruptcy, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 366 (1987).
2
See Geoff Nairn, FT REPORT—DIGITAL BUSINESS: Innovation Highlights Flaws
in Licence Model, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 8, 2006; CDC Corporation
Announces Preliminary Financial Results and Certain Operating Metrics for Q4 2005
and Full Year 2005, PR NEWSWIRE US, Mar. 3, 2006, available at
http://www.cdccorporation.net/newsroom/news/000493.shtml.
3
See Adobe Systems, Inc. v. One Stop Micros, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091–91 n.2
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
4
See, e.g., Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive
Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 337, 340 (1983).
5
For example, the enactment of the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980
provided that software could be copyrighted. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000). In addition, the
Patent and Trademark Office refused software patent applications until 1981, when the
Supreme Court held that an otherwise patentable invention does not become unpatentable
because it uses an algorithm or a computer program. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,
187 (1981).
6
Adobe, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1091.
7
Id. at 1092 (Amy Grant’s expert testimony).
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sales relying only on the provisions of the Copyright Act.8 When
using a license, the vendor can “make multiple ‘sales’ to the same
‘buyer’ of a copyrighted product that normally could only be sold
once to a buyer.”9 The vendor can also prevent the licensee of a
copy of a computer program from disposing of the copy under the
first sale doctrine of the Copyright Act.10 In addition, the license
agreement allows the licensee to obtain maintenance, performance
guarantees and other service arrangements from the licensor that
enhance the value of the software.11
In order to give both parties in a software license agreement the
control they desire over their future rights and obligations, the
license must be drafted to anticipate the bankruptcy of either
party.12 The policy of the federal intellectual property laws to
stimulate innovation13 may clash with the goals of the bankruptcy
8
Copyright protects only the expression of a work of authorship, but does not protect
the ideas embodied within the work. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Copyright also does not
protect decompilation and reengineering of software, which has been found to be a fair
use. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992).
9
2-8 MATTHEW BENDER, COMPUTER CONTRACTS § 8.01 (2006); see 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3) (2000).
10
BENDER, supra note 9, § 8.05.
11
Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134,
140–41 & n.12 (1999) (noting impracticality of implementing licenses without
“continuing assistance and maintenance from the software developer”); see Raymond T.
Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 281, 293 (1993) (stating “value conveyed
in a software transaction is often independent of the tangible item involved”). But see
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1560–66 (2005) (arguing that courts have
failed to police the licensing system, leaving consumers with substandard software
licensed without necessary support).
12
See, e.g., Gres, supra note 1, at 371–72; see generally David R. Kuney, Intellectual
Property Law in Bankruptcy Court: The Search for a More Coherent Standard in
Dealing with a Debtor’s Right to Assume and Assign Technology Licenses, 9 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 593 (2001) (discussing the tension between conflicting approaches
to assignability in intellectual property and bankruptcy law and implications for
licensees).
13
Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir.
1996) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51
(1989) (stating the patent system “encourage[s] the creation and disclosure of new,
useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive
right to practice the invention for a period of years”)); David I. Cisar et al., Exclusive and
Non-exclusive IP Licenses and Executory Contract Assumption and Assignment: Does
Exclusivity Matter?, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28 (Feb. 2003).
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code (giving the debtor a meaningful chance to reorganize and
make a fresh start and providing the maximum return to
creditors).14 Thus, license provisions written without a thorough
understanding of the bankruptcy environment can lead to
surprising and sometimes devastating results for both the licensor
and the licensee.15
This Article examines a number of issues that occur when one
of the parties to a software license agreement files for bankruptcy.
First, this Article will discuss the status of software license
agreements in bankruptcy. Second, this Article will examine the
bankruptcy issues that affect licensees, both when the licensor is
the debtor and when the licensee itself is the debtor. Third, this
Article will examine the bankruptcy issues that affect licensors.
Finally, this Article will provide practical guidelines to use when
drafting a license agreement in order to minimize the potential
problems related to one party’s bankruptcy. Although there are
many kinds of software license agreements,16 all of which should
be drafted with bankruptcy in mind, this Article will focus on
software license agreements that are individually negotiated and
drafted, typically between two companies, one of which is a
vendor and the other a user of the software.
I. SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. General Overview of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, one of the first steps is to
find all of the debtor’s assets and gather them into the bankruptcy
estate for eventual disbursement to creditors.17 In the case of
outstanding contracts, whether they become part of the bankruptcy
14

Richard Lieb, The Interrelationship of Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law, 64 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1990).
15
See generally J. Dianne Brinson, Software Distribution Agreements and Bankruptcy:
The Licensor’s Perspective, 64 WASH. L. REV. 499 (1989) (discussing the effects of
licensee bankruptcy on licensors and possible contractual prophylactics).
16
Common examples of license agreements are mass-market end-user license
agreements (“EULAs”), distribution, and resale agreements. Gres, supra note 1, at 366–
74.
17
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 92 (3d ed. 2001).
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estate depends on several factors.18 First, it must be determined if
the contract is an asset or a liability to the debtor.19 This
determination is fairly obvious if one of the parties has fully
performed and one party has at least some portion of its obligations
outstanding.20 The beneficial contract will be swept into the
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the debtor and the creditors.21
On the other hand, the debtor will breach a detrimental contract,
giving the other party a claim against the bankruptcy estate.22
If, however, both parties to the contract have enough
outstanding obligations to classify the contract as executory, the
contract can be both an asset and a liability to the debtor.23 In this
situation, the bankruptcy code authorizes a debtor in possession or
bankruptcy trustee to assume, assign or reject the contract.24 This
essentially allows the debtor to sweep any favorable contract into
the bankruptcy estate (assumption),25 sell the debtor’s interest in
the contract to a third party (assignment)26 or breach an
unfavorable contract giving the other party a claim on the
bankruptcy estate (rejection).27 Of course, this is a simplification
of the process and the choices of the debtor will depend on the
exact provisions contained within the contract. The goal of this
Article is to allow the parties to a software license agreement to
anticipate the bankruptcy definition of their contract giving them
the ability to control, ex ante, the choices a debtor will have in
bankruptcy regarding their agreement.
Because of the choice it allows to debtors, it is important to
determine whether the software license is considered an executory
contract under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. Whether a contract
is executory depends on the obligations of the parties set forth in
the agreement and the degree to which the parties have performed
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

See id. at 109–29.
Id. at 109–12.
See id. at 109.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 111.
Id. at 109.
11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000).
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 120–26.
Id.
Id. at 112–20.
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their duties as of the bankruptcy petition.28 Courts focus on the
economic realities of the transaction as opposed to the labels used
in the agreement (such as “license” or “royalty payment”).29
The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define “executory
contracts.”30 The most widely accepted definition is based on a
formulation put forth by Professor Vern Countryman in the early
1970s defining executory contracts as those in which “the
obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract
are so far unperformed that failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other.”31 Determining what acts or omissions
constitute a material breach requires an analysis of applicable nonbankruptcy law.32 The classification of executory contracts will be
discussed in more detail specifically regarding software license
agreements later in this Article in Parts I.D and E.
B. Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts
Once it is determined that a contract is indeed executory, § 365
authorizes the debtor in possession or trustee (“DIP/trustee”) to
assume, assume and assign, or reject that contract.33 The
DIP/trustee must cure certain defaults before assuming the
executory contract and must provide adequate assurance of future
performance of executory contracts that are in default.34 All
assumptions are subject to the court’s approval, but most
bankruptcy courts apply a relatively liberal “business judgment”

28

See Enter. Energy Corp. v. United States ex rel. IRS (In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc.),
50 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 1995). See generally Stuart M. Riback, Intellectual Property
Licenses: The Impact of Bankruptcy, in UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LICENSE 2004, at 215 (PLI 2004).
29
See Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc. (In re DAK Indus., Inc.), 66 F.3d 1091, 1095
n.2 (9th Cir. 1995).
30
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 109; BRINSON, supra note 15, at 511.
31
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Law: Part I, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973). See also In re Access Beyond Techs. Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 43
(Bankr. D. Del. 1999), citing Enter. Energy, 50 F.3d at 244 n.20.
32
Enter. Energy, 50 F.3d at 238.
33
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
34
11 U.S.C. § 365(b).
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standard in assessing any disputes over assumptions.35 Upon the
court’s approval of the assumption of an executory contract, the
entire contract is reinstated and becomes fully binding.36 This
right to assume may not be waived by a contract provision or other
pre-petition agreement, but it may be affected by non-bankruptcy
law, as discussed later in Part III.37
Once a debtor assumes an executory contract, it may seek to
assign that contract to a third party. Bankruptcy law generally
authorizes the assignment of executory contracts even though the
contract itself (or applicable non-bankruptcy law) may prohibit
assignment.38 This is to afford the bankrupt estate the greatest
flexibility in reorganizing its business and obtaining value for its
creditors, even where the agreement expressly prohibits
assignment.39 The Code, however, provides several exceptions
and limitations on the assignment of contracts.40 Of greatest
significance to software license agreements, the Bankruptcy Code
prohibits the assignment of an executory contract where
“applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract . . . from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in
possession, whether or not such contract . . . prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties”41 and “such party
does not consent to such assumption or assignment.”42 This
exception encompasses non-exclusive copyright and patent
licenses, which are non-assignable.43 The rationale behind this
35

See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985) (describing business judgment
standard as deferring to debtor’s decision to assume or reject unless such decision was “in
bad faith or in gross abuse of bankrupt’s retained business discretion”).
36
See Tenet Healthcare Phila., Inc. v. Nat’l Union of Hosp. Employees (In re
Allegheny Health, Educ. and Res. Found.), 383 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an
executory contract must be assumed in its entirety).
37
See In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 261 B.R. 103, 113 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
38
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2000).
39
See, e.g., FutureSource LLC v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 2002); In re
Wash. Capital Aviation & Leasing, 156 B.R. 167, 175 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
40
11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2000) as referenced in § 365(f)(1).
41
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A).
42
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(B).
43
In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, 269 B.R. 300, 309 (Bankr. Del. 2001) (“Under
copyright law, ‘a nonexclusive licensee has only a personal and not a property interest in
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policy is that licenses are similar to personal services contracts.44
The licensor has evaluated and relied on the promised performance
of the named licensee when negotiating the terms of the license,
and any substitution of licensee means a change in the substance of
the terms of the agreement.45 Because of the way § 365 is drafted,
once a contract falls under this assignment exception, a question
arises as to whether the contract can even be assumed by a debtor
in possession.46 Numerous courts have determined that § 365(c)(1)
not only prevents the assignment of executory contracts, but also
prevents the assumption and performance of the contract by the
debtor itself.47 The ramifications of these decisions on software
license agreements will be discussed later in this Article in Part III.
C. Rejection of Executory Contracts
Just as a DIP/trustee can assume a favorable executory
contract, a DIP/trustee may reject any executory contract, subject
to the bankruptcy court’s approval.48 Congress added this section
to “allow a debtor to maximize its assets by minimizing its
the [intellectual property],’ which ‘cannot be assigned unless the intellectual property
owner authorizes the assignment. . . .’” (quoting In re Patient Educ. Media, 201 B.R. 234,
242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997))); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult
Entm’t. Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999) (“our precedents make it clear that
federal patent law constitutes ‘applicable law’ within the meaning of § 365(c), and that
nonexclusive patent licenses are ‘personal and assignable only with the consent of the
licensor.’ (quoting Everex Sys. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 680
(9th Cir. 1996))).
44
See In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, 269 B.R. at 311.
45
See generally 2-8 MATTHEW BENDER, COMPUTER CONTRACTS § 8.02 (2006)
(discussing the application of copyright law to software licenses).
46
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 125–26; compare Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech
Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997), with Catapult Entm’t Inc., 165 F.3d 747. See also
discussion in Part III.
47
See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 271 (4th
Cir. 2004) (“Without RCI’s consent, Sunterra was precluded from assuming the
Agreement”); Catapult Entm’t. Inc., 165 F.3d at 754–55 (“We hold that, where
applicable nonbankruptcy law makes an executory contract nonassignable because the
identity of the nondebtor party is material, a debtor in possession may not assume the
contract absent consent of the nondebtor party.”); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83
(3d Cir. 1988) (“11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test—i.e., under the
applicable law, could the government refuse performance from ‘an entity other than the
debtor or the debtor in possession.’”).
48
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
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burdensome liabilities.”49 Rejection allows the debtor to notify the
other contracting party and the bankruptcy court that it will not
continue to perform its contractual obligations, similar in effect to
an anticipatory breach of contract.50 Bankruptcy courts also apply
the deferential business judgment rule in reviewing rejections of
executory contracts.51 If the court approves a rejection of an
executory contract, the Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor
is deemed to have breached the agreement, giving rise to a prepetition claim for damages for breach of contract.52 Essentially,
unless the non-debtor has secured collateral for itself, the nondebtor is left with a general unsecured claim against the debtor’s
estate for contract damages.53 The Bankruptcy Code bars the
remedy of specific performance for a rejected executory contract
licensing intellectual property.54 Rejections of intellectual property
licenses when the licensor is the debtor are also complicated by a
special provision giving the non-debtor licensee additional choices
unavailable to non-debtors in other executory contracts.55 The
consequences of rejection of a software license agreement will be
discussed in more detail Article in Part II.
D. The Classification of Software License Agreements in
Bankruptcy
In order to decide whether a software license agreement is an
executory contract, it is necessary to describe the license’s rights
and obligations.56 There are two broad categories of license
agreements for the purposes of this discussion: non-exclusive
licenses, which grant the licensee the right to make use of the
software without restricting the rights of the licensor to grant the
49

Walter D. Denson, The Source Code Escrow: A Worthwhile or Worthless Investment,
1 RUTGERS BANKR. L.J. 1, 10 (2003).
50
See Daniel T. Brooks, Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, 272
PLI/Pat 575, 607 (1988); Denson, supra note 49.
51
See Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R.,
318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943).
52
11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2000).
53
Brooks, supra note 50.
54
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (2000).
55
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2000).
56
See Robert L. Tamietti, Technology Licenses Under the Bankruptcy Code: A
Licensee’s Mine Field, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 303 (1988).
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same rights to other licensees; and exclusive licenses, which grant
a licensee the right to be the only party to use the software.57
In general, a nonexclusive software license is more like a rental
agreement than a sale.58 It is a contract in which the licensor
agrees to let the licensee use the licensor’s software application for
a specified period of time and in certain stated ways.59 The
licensee is essentially paying rent to the licensor for use of the
licensor’s intangible property. The licensor, however, does not
transfer ownership of the software, but retains the rights and
remedies associated with the intellectual property.60 Therefore, the
license is not considered an assignment of intellectual property.61
Instead, a non-exclusive license is merely a contractual promise
not to sue the licensee.62 As mentioned in Part I.B above, courts
consider most non-exclusive intellectual property licenses to be
non-assignable by the licensee without the consent of the
licensor.63
Exclusive licenses, on the other hand, are more like an
assignment or sale than the rental agreement of a nonexclusive
license.64 Similar to an assignment, an exclusive software license
is a transfer of copyright ownership.65 Importantly, unlike a nonexclusive license, exclusive licenses are generally assignable by
the licensee, unless the license agreement expressly provides
otherwise or the licensor specifically consents to the assignment.66
The rationale behind this rule is that the terms of a sale do not
normally turn on the identity of the buyer. Since the seller is not
affected by the agreement after the sale is complete, there is no
reliance on the personal services of the buyer/licensor when

57

Kuney, supra note 12, at 597.
See id. at 597–98.
59
See, e.g., BRINSON, supra note 15, at 509–10.
60
See Kuney, supra note 12, at 598.
61
See Richard L. Grier et al., Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act:
Bringing Commercial Law into the 21st Century, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 69 (2001).
62
In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996).
63
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(B) (2000); see supra Part I.B.
64
Kuney, supra note 12, at 598.
65
Id.
66
H. Ward Classen, Fundamentals of Software Licensing, 37 IDEA 1, 10 (1996); see
also In re Sentry Data, Inc., 87 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
58
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negotiating the terms of the agreement. However, not all exclusive
licenses resemble sales of intellectual property.67 For example, an
exclusive license to market the software, often referred to as a
software distribution agreement, is arguably a nonassignable
license because it is more like a service agreement than a transfer
of actual property.68
The next step in classifying software license agreements is to
decide whether they are executory contracts within the Bankruptcy
Code.69 As with any other contract, this requires an analysis of the
continuing obligations of both parties, using the Countryman
definition described in Part I.A.70 Since many patent and copyright
licenses contain standard provisions, some courts have simply
presumed that intellectual property license agreements are
executory without analyzing the nature of the ongoing obligations
on both sides of the agreement.71 Despite broad similarities to
patent and copyright licenses, since most software license
agreements, especially those that are individually negotiated, have
unique provisions and differ in the actual rights and obligations of
each party, a better analysis would look at each software license
agreement separately and make a decision depending on the
existing obligations of each party.72 The rest of this section will
look at common obligations contained in a typical software license
agreement in an attempt to allow a drafter to predict whether a
contract will be classified as executory based on the continuing
obligations imposed by the agreement.

67

See, e.g., BRINSON, supra note 15, at 510.
Classen, supra note 66; see also In re Sentry Data, Inc., 87 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1988).
69
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 109.
70
Id.
71
See, e.g., 75 RCC Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp., 287 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr. D. Md.
2003) (noting without analysis that “there is a long line of authority holding that
intellectual property licensing agreements such as the SLA [Software License
Agreement] are executory contracts.”), rev’d for other reasons, 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir.
2004); In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 B.R. 300, 308–09 (Bankr. D. Del.
2001); In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).
72
See In re Learning Publ’ns, Inc., 94 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re
Stein , Inc., 81 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
68
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E. Common Obligations of a Software License Agreement and Its
Resulting Classification as an Executory Contract
Although sometimes presumptively classified as nonexecutory, even exclusive licenses, which represent a more
complete conveyance of rights than non-exclusive licenses,
sometimes include significant ongoing contractual obligations and
therefore can be classified as executory contracts.73 In Rudaw, for
example, an exclusive transfer of copyright ownership was
considered executory when the debtor filed for bankruptcy before
the buyer completed all the installment payments for the
software.74
However, when the licensor bears little or no continuing
obligations and the agreement has further attributes of a sale, for
instance payment by lump sum, the agreement is better viewed as
non-executory.75 In fact, even though the parties to the agreement
may intend a non-exclusive license agreement and add labels to the
contract consistent with such a license, if the function of the
contract looks more like a sale, with substantial performance
completed at the outset of the contract, the court will look beyond
the intent to find the agreement non-executory.76
Clearly, significant continuing obligations, would also cause a
non-exclusive license to be classified as executory.77 A more
73
In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prods. Ltd., 83 B.R. 241, 246 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988).
74
Id. at 243–46.
75
In re Stein, 81 B.R. 263, 266–67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Monument Record
Corp., 61 B.R. 866, 868–69 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986).
76
Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc. (In re DAK Indus., Inc.), 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 n.2
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding a bilateral “License Agreement” granting DAK nonexclusive,
worldwide license rights to distribute Microsoft’s Word for Windows software program
on its computer systems to be a lump sum sale of software units based on (1) the pricing
and timing of the payments which was a lump sum paid at the outset of the agreement
regardless of how many units it sold; (2) the licensee received all of its rights at the
beginning of the agreement; (3) the agreement did not simply permit the debtor to use the
technology, but permitted the debtor to sell the technology; and (4) at the time the
agreement commenced, Microsoft delivered the master disk from which the copies were
to be made and therefore had substantially completed its performance at the outset of the
contract).
77
Some examples of common continuing obligations are a continuing obligation to
account for and pay royalties, duties of notice, responsibilities relating to reporting,
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difficult question in terms of non-exclusive licenses, however, is
whether the licensor’s implied contractual promise not to sue the
licensee for infringement by itself represents an independent
obligation that can support the classification of the contract as
executory.
Several cases do classify contracts with such
obligations as executory.78 However, other courts, examining the
nature of intellectual property rights, have held otherwise.79 In
addition, a license with only continuing obligations of
confidentiality by both parties to the license has been considered
executory.80 However, a license is not executory simply because it
obligates one party to make payments of money to the other.81
Provisions that constitute mere covenants that, if not followed,
might relieve the other contracting party of continuing
performance, but would not amount to breach of the contract, also
do not lead to a definition of executory.82
The practical result of the above summary is that each software
license must be analyzed individually, taking into account all the
obligations owed by each party, to decide whether that particular
contract will be considered executory by a bankruptcy court.83 The
rest of this Article, while exploring several specific bankruptcy
issues that should be anticipated by drafters of software license
agreements, will examine several prominent cases. These cases
also provide illustrations of software license agreements that have
been found executory and allow a practitioner to make an educated
labeling, policing, service, and maintenance, refraining from licensing to others, and
obligations to provide product upgrades. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th
Cir. 1985); Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th
Cir. 1980).
78
E.g., In re Golden Books Family Entm’t Inc., 269 B.R. 300, 309 (Bankr. D. Del.
2001); In re Access Beyond Techs. Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 43 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); Everex
Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996).
79
See In re Gencor Indus., Inc., 298 B.R. 902, 907 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003).
80
RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir.
2004).
81
See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1046, citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595.
82
In re Gencor Indus., Inc., 298 B.R. 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that Most
Favored Nations Clause and Patent Defense Clause of licensing agreement were mere
conditions of payment by the licensee, whose failure would excuse further payment,
rather than material continuing obligations whose failure would breach the contract).
83
See, e.g., BRINSON, supra note 15, at 525–26.
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guess about the status of a pending contract.84 Since the line
between executory and non-executory is sometimes unclear, a
prudent drafter should anticipate either conclusion and plan
accordingly.85
II. ISSUES FACING A LICENSEE WHEN THE DEBTOR IS A LICENSOR
Many companies license software from software vendors to
facilitate their business, either relying on the licensed software for
internal purposes, such as data processing and accounting, or to
assist in the creation of their actual product.86 Often, once
software is licensed and brought into the company, the business
relies on that software, which becomes an integral part of the
business process.87 Replacing that software is often extremely
expensive even if it just requires retraining of the employees that
use it.88 In addition, the licensee is usually dependent on the
licensor to correct any bugs or defects in the software, as well as to
perform any necessary maintenance on the software.89
Consequently, software license agreements are often accompanied
by a “maintenance” agreement, which requires the licensor to
update, debug, and maintain the software for the term of the
contract.90
The software licensee, therefore, has a significant interest in
making sure its license endures for the entire duration of the
agreement.91 In a controversial 1985 case, Lubrizol Enterprises,
Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,92 however, the Fourth
84

See, e.g., Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1046.
See Michelle Morgan Harner et al., Debtors Beware: The Expanding Universe of
Non-Assumable/Non-Assignable Contracts in Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
187, 189 (2005); 3-27 MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 27.13.
86
See Jonathan L. Mezrich, Source Code Escrow: An Exercise in Futility?, 5 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 117, 117–18 (2001).
87
Id.
88
See id.
89
Id.
90
Gres, supra note 1, at 363–64.
91
See Richard M. Cieri, et. al., Protecting Technology and Intellectual Property Rights
When a Debtor Infringes on Those Rights, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349, 355 (2000).
92
Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986).
85
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Circuit found that a technology license agreement was an
executory contract rejectable by the licensor-debtor under
§ 365(a).93 In the context of a licensee who depends on the
licensor for maintenance of software critical to their business, the
rejection by the licensor can be devastating.94 It requires the
licensee to either stop using the software altogether and replace it
with something else, or instead to renegotiate a new license with
the licensor who can essentially hold-out for an inflated price.95
Although Lubrizol involved a technology license rather than a
software license agreement, after it was decided, a number of
commentators warned that software license agreements would also
be treated as rejectable executory contracts in the bankruptcy of a
software licensor.96
A. Lubrizol Enterprises and Select-A-Seat
The agreement at issue in Lubrizol was a nonexclusive right to
use the debtor’s technology.97 Although the license was executed
and the instruction manuals were delivered to Lubrizol before
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court held this was an executory
contract and that attempts at new licensing of the technology, the
debtor’s principal asset in its Chapter 11 reorganization, were
hindered by the existing license.98 Under the agreement, the
debtor’s continuing duties were: 1) to notify Lubrizol about any
claims of the licensed technology infringing another’s patent; 2) to
defend the licensee Lubrizol in any patent infringement suit; 3) to
hold Lubrizol harmless from certain losses; and 4) to notify
Lubrizol of any licenses granted.99 Lubrizol had continuing
contractual obligations to: 1) account for and pay the licensor
royalties for the use of the licensed technology process; and 2) pay

93

See id. at 1047.
Cieri, supra note 91, at 355.
95
Gres, supra note 1, at 364–65.
96
See, e.g., BRINSON, supra note 15, at 520; James E. Meadows, Lubrizol: What Will It
Mean for the Software Industry, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 311
(1987); Gres, supra note 1, at 365–66.
97
In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 34 B.R. 521, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).
98
Id. at 525.
99
Id. at 524.
94
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off other existing debts.100 According to the bankruptcy court,
these obligations, even if contingent, were important aspects of the
consideration given by the licensor to Lubrizol, and therefore could
be sufficient to make the contract executory.101
The district court disagreed with the bankruptcy court, finding
the technology license agreement non-executory and noting that
general warranties are not enough of a continuing obligation on
which to base a finding of an executory contract.102 In addition,
the court assumed that even if Richmond was allowed to reject the
license, this rejection would not affect Lubrizol’s ability to use the
technology or relieve Lubrizol of its obligation to pay royalties.103
The district court did not think that it had the “power, in a
summary proceeding, to strip Lubrizol of the intellectual property
it had purchased from Richmond.”104
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision,
finding, like the bankruptcy court, that Richmond’s continuing
duties to licensee Lubrizol and Lubrizol’s duty of accounting for
and paying royalties were sufficient to make the contract
executory.105 In addition to relieving the licensor estate of future
performance obligations under the license, the Lubrizol decision,
disagreeing with the district court’s assumption, also gave the
licensor a complete rescission of the technology transfer.106 This
aspect of the Lubrizol decision was predicted to be especially
disastrous for software licensees because it revealed the possibility
that a licensee could lose all rights to licensed software should the
licensor file bankruptcy.107
In fact, just five years earlier, in In re Select-A-Seat, the Ninth
Circuit also held that an exclusive software distribution and use
100

Id.
Id.
102
In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 38 B.R. 341, 344 (E.D. Va. 1984).
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1045–46
(4th Cir. 1985).
106
Stuart Moskowitz, Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy: New ‘Veto Power’
For Licensees Under Section 365(n), 44 BUS. LAW. 771, 780 (1989); see Lubrizol, 756
F.2d at 1048.
107
Moskowitz, supra note 106.
101

BISK_FORMATTED_STAFFPROOF_032307

628

3/24/2007 3:48:32 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. XVII

license was a rejectable executory contract.108 However, in SelectA-Seat, the debtor’s trustee sought only to reject the debtorlicensor’s continuing warranties of title and fitness for purpose and
the agreement’s exclusive-dealing obligation.109 Unlike the total
forfeit of use rights by the licensee in Lubrizol, the court allowed
the former exclusive licensee to continue using and selling the
licensed software on a nonexclusive basis.110 In comparison, the
entire rescission aspect of Lubrizol held that the licensee’s right to
use the licensed technology terminated when the license agreement
was rejected in the licensor’s bankruptcy, leaving the licensee with
only a claim for damages for breach of contract.111
After the Lubrizol decision, the intellectual property
community’s fear that it was powerless to protect licensees from
licensor bankruptcy proceedings, resulted in Congressional
amendments to § 365, commonly known as the Intellectual
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1987 (“IPLBA”).112
Congress’s intent in passing this amendment was to protect
licensees’ rights to intellectual property in the event of a
bankruptcy.113
B. The Congressional Response to Lubrizol and § 365(n)
The IPLBA was codified in § 365(n), allowing a licensee to
retain its use right in licensed intellectual property even if the
licensor rejects the license agreement in bankruptcy.114 Under
§ 365(n), licensees have two choices when the licensor rejects their
license while in bankruptcy. First, the licensee may elect to treat
108
Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290, 292–93 (9th
Cir. 1980).
109
Id. at 292.
110
Id.
111
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d 1048.
112
Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Act (IPLBA) of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102
Stat. 2538 (1988) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)); see John P. Musone, Crystallizing the
Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy Act: A Proposed Solution To Achieve
Congress’ Intent, 13 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 509, 509 n.3 (1997).
113
S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 1–5 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207
(explaining that the purpose is “to make clear that the rights of an intellectual property
licensee to use the licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the
rejection of the license . . . .”); see 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2000).
114
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
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the license as terminated and assert a claim for breach of contract
damages.115 More importantly, the licensee may elect to retain its
licensed rights in the intellectual property for the duration of the
contract.116 If the licensee chooses the second option, it must
continue to make all royalty payments due to the debtor under the
license agreement.117 The debtor, however, will have “no
obligation to the licensee after rejection other than to grant the
licensee unimpeded use of the technology.”118
C. Lubrizol Problems That Persist after the IPLBA
Although the IPBLA amended § 365(n) in response to
Lubrizol, it did not fix all of the problems brought to light by that
decision. First, it did not clarify the confusion over what it means
to reject a contract in bankruptcy.119 Second, it did not give any
guidance to the courts on how to resolve what is to happen to a
licensee when a licensor attempts a free and clear sale in
bankruptcy under § 363.120
1. What Does It Mean to Reject a Software License in
Bankruptcy?
As mentioned in Part I.C above, a trustee can reject an
executory contract under the Code.121 There appears to be
confusion in the courts, however, including the Lubrizol court, on
what is the “effect” of rejecting a contract using § 365.122 A
rejection is simply an election to breach which does not cause the
contract to go away or constitute rescission.123 However, some
courts treat rejection as a species of an avoidance, giving creditors
115

Id. § 365(n)(1)(A).
Id. § 365(n)(1)(B).
117
Id. § 365(n)(2).
118
Cieri, supra note 91, 355–56; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3).
119
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 109.
120
Robert M. Zinman, Precision in Statutory Drafting: The Qualitech Quagmire and
the Sad History of 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV 97, 100
(2004).
121
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
122
See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048
(4th Cir. 1985).
123
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 112.
116
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inside of bankruptcy something they would not have had outside
bankruptcy.124 In Lubrizol, for example, the district court assumed
that rejection did not restrict Lubrizol, the licensee, from using the
technology already in its possession.125 The bankruptcy and
appeals courts assumed just the opposite; they treated the rejection
as an avoidance of the entire contract, placing the parties in the
position they would be in if the contract had never been entered.126
However, nothing about the nature of rejection requires that the
trustee be able to undo a property transfer.127 In fact, for real
property, the code explicitly states that rejection simply follows
applicable non-bankruptcy law, and does nothing to dispossess the
licensee of real property.128 The trustee can reject the real property
lease and free the debtor’s estate from any ongoing obligations, but
the trustee cannot undo the lease entirely while the lessee is still in
possession of the property.129
Section 365(n)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code does limit the
protection afforded to the licensee’s § 365(n) intellectual property
rights to those that existed immediately before the licensor’s
bankruptcy case commenced.130 If the licensee elects to retain its
rights under § 365(n), they are permitted to enforce only the
passive obligations of the licensor.131 The licensee cannot require
specific performance of other obligations included in the license,
such as service provisions by the licensor.132 Of course, the
licensee would have claims against the bankruptcy estate for any of
these service provisions, such as obligations of the licensor to
provide maintenance and upgrades.133 However, unlike § 365(h),

124

Id.
756 F.2d at 1048.
126
See id.
127
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 114.
128
11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A) (2000); see also BAIRD, supra note 17, at 114.
129
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h); see also BAIRD, supra note 17, at 114.
130
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B).
131
Id.
132
Id.
See also Madlyn Gleich Primoff et. al., E-Commerce and Dot-Com
Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including
Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related Issues Under Section 365(c), 365(e) and
365(n) of the Bankruptcy code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 342 (2000).
133
BAIRD, supra note 17, at 116.
125
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§ 365(n) does not explicitly state what rejection means for any
technology already being used by the licensee.134
Commentators disagree about whether the rule for rejection of
all technology licenses should mirror that of a traditional real
property lease.135
However, the specific rules governing
technology licenses in § 365(n) are similar to those governing real
property in § 365(h), leading to the conclusion that the results of
rejection should be the same.136 There is no bankruptcy reason to
override applicable non-bankruptcy law and allow the trustee the
power to recapture rights they could not outside bankruptcy.137
The correct view should be that “rejection of executory aspects of
a contract does not bring about a rescission of property transfers
completed prior to bankruptcy.”138
2. What Is the Effect of a Debtor-Licensor § 363 Free and
Clear Sale?
Another question left open by the addition of § 365(n) is how
to reconcile this provision with § 363(f).139 Section 363(f)
authorizes a “free and clear sale,” allowing the sale of a debtor’s
property free of any “interest” other than the estate’s.140 If a free
and clear sale of the underlying technology is held to trump the
§ 365(n) protection given to technology licensees, then such a sale
will extinguish the licensee’s rights to use the licensed technology,
134

11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2000).
Compare BAIRD, supra note 17, at 118, with BRINSON, supra note 15, at 529.
136
See, e.g., BAIRD, supra note 17, at 120–21.
137
Id. at 120.
138
BRINSON, supra note 15, at 529.
139
11 U.S.C. § 363(f):
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and
clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if—
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear
of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is
greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept
a money satisfaction of such interest.
140
11 U.S.C. § 363(f); Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel (In re Qualitech Steel
Corp.), 327 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2003).
135

BISK_FORMATTED_STAFFPROOF_032307

632

3/24/2007 3:48:32 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. XVII

just as in the Lubrizol case.141 While there are relatively few cases
deciding this issue, in 2003 the Seventh Circuit decided that for the
analogous executory contract protection for property leases,
§ 365(h), a free and clear sale of the underlying real property does
in fact trump the § 365(h) statutory protection to leases.142
As in Lubrizol, the district court in Qualitech disagreed with
both the bankruptcy and the appeals courts.143 The district court
concluded that § 365(h) trumped the free and clear sale because of
the specific terms of § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) expressly stating that a
non-debtor lessee may elect to retain possession of the property
after a rejection of an unexpired lease thus allowing the lessee to
remain in possession of the property even in the face of the § 363
sale.144 The district court also looked to the legislative history of
§ 365(h) and found that the intent of Congress was to preserve the
lessee’s estate.145 Finally, the district court noted that § 365(h) does
not reference any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code as a
limitation.146
The Seventh Circuit overruled the district court, using statutory
construction to decide that a free and clear sale does trump
§ 365(h)’s protection of the lessee’s possessory interest in the sold
property.147 The court interpreted the term “any interest” as used
in § 363(f) as being sufficiently broad to include the lessee’s
interest as a lessee.148 Since, § 363(f) standing alone permits the
sale of the property free and clear of a lessee’s possessory interest,
the court concluded that § 365(h) can only protect the lessee if it
supersedes the free and clear sale.149 However, because neither
section contains any limiting cross-section, and § 365(h)(1)(A) is
limited to when an unexpired lease is rejected, but does not
mention sale, the court held that § 365(h) does not supersede the
141

See In re Qualitech Steel Corp., 327 F.3d at 540.
Id.
143
Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel (In re Qualitech Steel Corp.), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8328 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
144
Id. at *14.
145
Id. at *37.
146
Id. at *46.
147
In re Qualitech Steel Corp., 327 F.3d at 540.
148
Id. at 545.
149
Id. at 546–47.
142
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free and clear sale.150 In addition, the court noted that § 363 itself
provides for the requirement of adequate protection to any entity
with an interest in the property to be sold, here the lessee.151
Holding that this adequate protection can be provided in the form
of compensation as opposed to a continued possessory interest in
the property, the court held that this right to compensation was
adequate protection for the lessee.152
This Seventh Circuit decision has caused great concern in the
real estate investment community because it allows a landlord in
bankruptcy to ignore the protections given by § 365(h) potentially
resulting in a disruption in leasehold investments.153 Since
Qualitech does apply normal rules of statutory interpretation, and
may therefore be followed by other courts, it has resulted in an
urge to Congress to address these complications in the statute.154
One caveat to Qualitech that may prove helpful to future lessees is
that the lessee in the case did not object, as was their right under
§ 363, to the free and clear sale.155 There is no way to predict what
would have happened if the lessee had filed an objection at the
time the sale was proposed.156
Although Qualitech concerned a real property lease and
§ 365(h) as opposed to a technology license and § 365(n), since the
Qualitech court’s analysis would be equally applicable to the
§ 365(n) protection of technology licensees, those rights and
interests may also be at risk in a free and clear sale.157

150

Id. at 547.
Id. at 548.
152
Id.
153
Zinman, supra note 120, at 100.
154
Id. at 100–01.
155
In re Qualitech Steel Corp., 327 F.3d at 541.
156
Peter N. Tamposi, Tenants Beware—Your Lease Rights May Be Subject to
Termination by the Bankruptcy Court: Licensees of Intellectual Property Take Note: You
May Be Next, 22-8 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30 (2003).
157
Id. at 30.
151
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III. ISSUES FACING A LICENSEE WHEN THEY ARE
ALSO THE DEBTOR
The Lubrizol case, as demonstrated above, highlighted the
problem of rejection by a debtor-licensor depriving a licensee of
rights negotiated pre-bankruptcy. A similar loss of contractual
rights can arise when the licensee in a software license agreement
files for bankruptcy and the licensor refuses to consent to an
assignment of the license by the reorganized debtor in possession.
A. Section 365 and the Hypothetical versus the Actual Test
As discussed in Section IB and C above, § 365 gives a trustee,
or debtor in possession, the authority to assume, assign or reject
the executory contracts of the debtor, notwithstanding any contrary
provisions appearing in such contracts.158
Section 365(c),
however, contains an exception to this general rule, prohibiting a
debtor from assuming or assigning an executory contract if
“applicable law” excuses the non-debtor party from accepting
performance from anyone other than the original contract party.159
These rules develop from a straightforward reading of § 365(c).
Confusion arises, however, when § 365(c)(1) is read together
with § 365(f).160 Section 365(f) permits a debtor to assume and
assign an executory contract to a third party.161 Before assignment
to a third party, the debtor must first assume the contract and
provide the non-debtor party adequate assurance of future
performance by the proposed assignee.162 Since § 365(f) contains
158
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t.
Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1999).
159
11 U.S.C. § 365(c); Harner, supra note 85, at 197.
160
Harner, supra note 85, at 197.
161
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (“Except as provided in subsection[] . . . (c) of this section,
notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or
in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or
lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease . . . .”).
162
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(A) (“The trustee may assign an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor only if . . . the trustee assumes such contract or lease in
accordance with the provisions of this section . . . .”); § 365(f)(2)(B) (“The trustee may
assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor only if . . . adequate
assurance of future performance by the assignee of such contract or lease is provided,
whether or not there has been a default in such contract or lease.”).
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the provision “notwithstanding a provision in [the] executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that
prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or
lease,” the two sections seem to conflict if “applicable” law
excuses a non-debtor party from accepting the performance of a
third party assignee.163 In this situation, § 365(c)(1) would prevent
both assumption and assignment of the contract, while § 365(f)
would permit such assumption and assignment.164 Even more
problematic is what a court should do in the case that applicable
law prohibits assignment, but the debtor is seeking only to assume
and not assign the executory contract.165
While some courts attempt to resolve this apparent conflict by
interpreting the term “applicable law” differently in § 365(c)(1)
and § 365(f),166 most courts give effect to § 365(c)(1) when the
executory contract is for personal services.167 If a debtor in
possession seeks to assume a license for the benefit of a
reorganized debtor, but that license is considered a personal
services contract preventing such assumption, the licensor is put in
a position of extraordinary power over the debtor-licensee,
especially if the technology licensed by the executory contract is
critical for the survival of the reorganized debtor.168 The licensor
will be able to hold-out for significant price increases and, similar
to the licensor-debtor in a Lubrizol-type situation, can extract
exorbitant fees to allow the licensee merely to retain its bargainedfor benefit.169
So, the answer to the question of whether § 365(c)(1) or
§ 365(f) reigns when the debtor-licensee attempts to assume a
license has vital importance to the survival of the reorganized
163

Harner, supra note 85, at 197.
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 365(f).
165
See id.
166
See, e.g., RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257,
266 (4th Cir. 2004).
167
See, e.g., Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t. Inc.), 165 F.3d
747, 752 (9th Cir. 1999); In re James Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534, 538 (11th Cir.
1994); In re Magness, 972 F.2d 689, 695 (6th Cir. 1992).
168
See Harner, supra note 85, at 233–35.
169
See generally id. (describing the consequences of § 365(c)(1), where a debtor wishes
to assume an executory contract and applicable nonbankruptcy law restricts assignment).
164

BISK_FORMATTED_STAFFPROOF_032307

636

3/24/2007 3:48:32 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. XVII

debtor.170 Currently, the courts are split between two tests for
determining the answer to this question.171 The first test, the
hypothetical test, prohibits a debtor from assuming an executory
contract over the non-debtor’s objection “if applicable law would
bar assignment to a hypothetical third party, even where the debtor
in possession has no intention of assigning the contract in question
to any such third party.”172 The second test, the actual test, only
prohibits the assignment of an executory contract if the debtor
actually seeks to assign the contract.173 The actual test thus allows
the debtor-licensee to retain its contractual benefit as long as it
does not also attempt to assign that benefit to a third party and will
be the test preferred by licensees.
B. Catapult Entertainment and Sunterra Corporation
Unfortunately, many courts have opted for the hypothetical test
when dealing with technology licenses.174 For example, in
Catapult, a patent licensor attempted to bar a debtor/licensee from
assuming patent licenses as part of its Chapter 11 reorganization.175
While the bankruptcy and district courts approved the assumption
as part of the confirmed reorganization plan, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, using the hypothetical test to hold that § 365(c)(1) barred
the licensee from assuming the licenses.176 The Catapult court
stated that “where applicable non-bankruptcy law makes an
executory contract non-assignable because the identity of the nondebtor party is material, a debtor in possession may not assume the
contract absent consent of the nondebtor party.”177
In addition, the Fourth Circuit adopted the equivalent of the
hypothetical test for software licenses in In re Sunterra

170

Id.
Id.
172
Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th
Cir. 1999).
173
Harner, supra note 159, at 235.
174
See, e.g., In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d at 748; RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra
Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2004).
175
In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d at 749.
176
Id. at 749–51.
177
Id. at 754–55.
171
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Corporation.178 In Sunterra, the licensee was a resort management
that entered into a non-exclusive license to use software from RCI,
the licensor, for functions such as recording reservations,
managing resort properties, and marketing and financing
timeshares.179 In addition to basing its internal operations on the
licensed software, Sunterra, the licensee, invested large amounts of
capital into the licensed system by developing its own software
enhancements, which Sunterra then owned under the license
agreement.180 “[T]he bankruptcy court confirmed Sunterra’s plan
of reorganization” finding that the RCI license agreement was not
an executory contract, and even if it were, the actual test allowed
the assumption of the agreement since Sunterra did not intend to
assign it to a third party.181 The bankruptcy court reasoned that
RCI would not be damaged if Sunterra, as debtor in possession,
“assumed the very contract rights it had possessed prior to
bankruptcy.”182
The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s ultimate
assumption decision, but disagreed with the finding that the license
was non-executory.183 The district court assumed the license was
executory because “there is a long line of authority holding that
intellectual property licensing agreements . . . are executory
contracts.”184 Although it was an executory contract, the district
court did agree that Sunterra could assume the license by applying
the actual test.185
The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, found the license to be an
executory contract using the “Countryman Test” of executory
contract, because at the time of the bankruptcy each party owed the

178

In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 262.
Id. at 260.
180
Id. at 261.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 261–62.
183
Id. at 262.
184
RCC Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp., 287 B.R. 864, 865 (D. Md. 2003) (citing In re
CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc.,
237 B.R. 32, 43–44 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
185
In re Sunterra, 261 F.3d at 263; RCC Tech. Corp., 278 B.R. at 866.
179
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other an ongoing obligation of confidentiality.186 In addition, the
court adopted the hypothetical test and held that Sunterra was
precluded from assuming the license because “no matter how
appealing” the actual test would be from a policy standpoint, the
plain language required the use of the hypothetical test.187
Sunterra, who standardized its internal operations on licensed
software, invested large amounts of capital in customizing that
software, and even owned the enhancements it created, was
deprived of any use of that software in its reorganization unless
given explicit consent by the licensor.188 This outcome is just
another example of how the current bankruptcy code insufficiently
protects licenses.189 The consequences for licensees who lose all
their contractual rights in bankruptcy are exceedingly harsh.190
The hypothetical test makes the license of the debtor-licensee
completely void.191 In addition, in cases where the licensed
software is embedded within hardware, the application of
§ 365(c)(1) can lead to the prohibition of the simple selling off of a
debtor’s assets.192 For instance, if a trustee wants to sell off a
router with a ROM embedded with licensed software, the trustee
would be precluded from selling unless the licensor agreed to the
sale. The licensor thus can use withholding his consent to
effectively extort the licensee.193

186

Id. at 264. The Countryman Test provides that a contract is executory if the
“obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far
unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material breach excusing the performance of the other.” Countryman, supra note 31,
at 460.
187
Id. at 269.
188
Id. at 260.
189
Sommer Nicole Louie, The Inadequacy of Bankruptcy Protection for the
Biotechnology Industry, 22 BANK. DEV. J. 337, 362 (2005).
190
Id. at 365.
191
Id. at 361.
192
Cf. In re Pathnet, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1262 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002).
193
Cf. Zinman, supra note 120, at 159–60 (explaining the potential stranglehold a tenant
has over a debtor by being able to sell the property regardless of any anti-assignment
provisions).

BISK_FORMATTED_STAFFPROOF_032307

2007

3/24/2007 3:48:32 PM

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BANKRUPTCY

639

IV. ISSUES FACING A LICENSOR WHEN THE DEBTOR IS A LICENSEE
Licensors also should plan for the possible bankruptcy of the
licensee when drafting the license agreement. In general, the
advantages given to a licensee in bankruptcy, described above, will
work as a constraint on the licensor. A licensor may prefer to
terminate any license with any licensee who files for bankruptcy,
but it is not as easy as simply providing for termination of the
contract upon either party’s filing of a bankruptcy petition in the
license agreement. Under the Bankruptcy Code, these clauses are
called “ipso facto” or bankruptcy clauses, and have no effect.194 A
debtor’s property interest becomes property of the estate
notwithstanding a provision in the license agreement that “is
conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor,
[or] on the commencement of a case under this title . . . , and that
effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or
termination of the debtor’s interest in property” upon the
commencement of bankruptcy.195 Also, as opposed to the
protection given to technology licensees, the IPLBA does not
extend any special protection to licensors whose licensees file for
bankruptcy.196
A. Rejection, Assumption, and Assignment by the Licensee
When the licensee is in bankruptcy, as mentioned above, as a
debtor, the licensee will have three options with regard to the
license agreement—rejection, assumption, and assumption and
assignment.197 If the licensee chooses to reject the license, the
licensor will lose any anticipated revenues and any expected
performance still due by the licensee.198 The licensor will have a
claim on the debtor’s estate for the breach of the agreement;
however, this will usually bring in only a small percentage of the
actual damages.199

194
195
196
197
198
199

11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (2000); see also BRINSON, supra note 15, at 527.
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1).
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
See 11 U.S.C. § 365.
BRINSON, supra note 15, at 528.
Id.
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If the licensee decides to assume the executory license, the
licensor may have other problems. First, although the assumption
is a new promise to perform, the entity now making this promise is
under the constraints of the bankruptcy process and the licensor
may see this as an increased business risk.200 If the licensee has
not actually breached the contract at the time of its bankruptcy
filing, there is no requirement of any adequate assurance of future
performance.201 In addition, even if there is a breach, which would
allow the licensor to terminate the agreement outside of
bankruptcy, the licensee can instead choose to cure the breach and
give adequate assurance of future performance.202 The court gets
to decide what is acceptable adequate assurance, even if the
licensor does not agree.203
In addition, as described above, a licensor will have a hard time
predicting when a court will find a software license assumable.204
First, there is the question of whether the hypothetical or actual test
will be used to decide if assumption only will be allowed.205
Second, since a software license is not a pure patent or copyright
license, there is some risk that a court will find that software
licenses are not personal contracts and that, therefore, applicable
law does not prevent their assignment to a third party.206 In fact,
even Vern Countryman, the author of the current executory
contract definition, finds the notion that even pure patent licenses
are all personal services contracts and thus blocked from
assignability as “too mechanical” an analysis.207 If a court finds
the software license validly assignable under applicable law, the
licensor could find itself in a position of licensing its technology to
a third party it objects to, including possibly a competitor.208

200

Id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
See supra Part III.
205
See supra notes 169–87 and accompanying text in Part III.B.
206
BRINSON, supra note 15, at 531–32.
207
Id. at 534; Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 479, 503 (1974).
208
See BRINSON, supra note 15, at 534.
201
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B. The Assignability of Software License Agreements
For example, in In re Sentry Data,209 a bankruptcy court found
that a software license and distribution agreement was assignable
because applicable law allowed the assignment in the absence of a
specific contract provision prohibiting such assignment.210 In this
case, Sentry, a software vendor, was the licensor and did not want
to allow an assignment by the licensee.211 Since the court found
that the contract made no express or implied reference to personal
services, to marketing best efforts, or to any prohibition on
assignment, the contract was assignable.212 Important to this
determination was the fact that the contract included a provision
permitting sublicensing suggesting that Sentry did not intend to
restrict the license to a particular entity.213 The court did not even
mention the presumption of intellectual property licenses as
unassignable personal services contracts.214
In Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp.,215 the parties
had cross-license agreements for non-exclusive perpetual
licenses.216 Each cross-license included a broad prohibition on
assignment or sublicensing, but allowed the benefits of the crosslicenses to be extended to affiliated companies.217
When
Cambridge Biotech (“CBC”) filed for bankruptcy, it proposed to
assume the cross-licenses and then sell all its stock and assign the
cross-licenses to a subsidiary of a direct competitor to Institut
Pasteur (“Pasteur”).218 Not surprisingly, Pasteur objected to
licensing its technology to a direct competitor.219 The First Circuit
upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow the assumption of
the cross-licenses and the determination that the proposed sale was
209

87 B.R. 943 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
Id. at 948.
211
Id. at 945.
212
Id. at 948.
213
Id.; Elaine D. Ziff, The Effect of Corporate Acquisitions on the Target Company’s
License Rights, 57 BUS. LAW. 767 (2002).
214
Id.
215
104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997).
216
Id. at 490.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id.
210
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not actually an assignment, but merely an assumption by the
reorganized debtor under new ownership.220 Although a patent
license, the court found that the relationship between the two
parties was not a personal services contract.221 However, since the
First Circuit adopts the actual test, if the use by the new owners is
not an assignment, the licensee will be allowed to assume a
contract it does not intend to assign even if the applicable law
would not ordinarily permit the assignment.222 Therefore, the First
Circuit did not need to decide whether the license was a personal
services contract or not. The result of the decision, though,
effectively required Pasteur to license its patented technology to a
competitor.
Some courts, however, take into consideration the commercial
interests of the licensor when deciding whether to allow an
assignment by a debtor-licensee.223 The bankruptcy court in In re
Access Beyond Techs., Inc.224 allowed a patent licensor to prohibit
assignment by the debtor-licensee to a direct competitor that would
eliminate any competitive advantage by the licensor in the
market.225 First, the court determined that the license was
executory because each party had a continuing obligation to refrain
from suing the other for infringement and each party was required
to grant the other party sub-licenses.226 Noting that the patent laws
are designed to prevent a direct competitor from using a patented
invention without permission of the patent owner, the court found
that the patent license was a personal services contract and not
assignable notwithstanding the provision allowing sublicensing.227
Although there are few cases deciding the issue of whether
software licenses are personal services contracts and thus
unassignable by a debtor-licensee, two such cases find that

220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id. at 491.
Id.
See id. at 494.
See Ziff, supra note 213, at 767.
237 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 45.
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software licenses are unassignable under applicable law.228 The
court in Buildnet found that under the Copyright Act, nonexclusive
software licenses are personal to the licensees and therefore not
assignable without the consent of the licensor.229 In addition, since
the software at issue was “highly sophisticated and customized for
the individual needs of a customer,” the needs of the customer
were reflected in the purchase price making the identity of the
licensee material.230
Since the license also contained a
confidentiality provision, the possibility of purchase by a
competitor would “strip the copyright holder of the right to control
the dissemination of their copyrighted material and would
undermine the purpose of the Copyright Act.”231
V. DRAFTING A SOFTWARE LICENSE TO PROTECT YOUR CLIENT
IN THE EVENT OF A BANKRUPTCY
This part provides some ideas of possible fixes to the problems
listed in the rest of this Article. While by no means an exhaustive
list of tips for negotiating or drafting a software licensing
agreement, it does provide some idea of how a party can protect its
rights in anticipation of a future bankruptcy filing by one of the
parties to the agreement.
A. Congressional Fixes
Much of the confusion inherent in software licenses in
bankruptcy arises due to the ambiguity in the Bankruptcy Code
when reading § 365(c)(1) and § 365(f) together.232 One way to
make the results of a bankruptcy petition on a software license
more predictable would be to actually fix the statute.233 Either
section could be amended to make the two provisions consistent.
One proposed change would amend § 365(c)(1) to read “the
228

RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir.
2004); In re BulidNet, Inc., 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1851 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2002).
229
In re BuildNet, Inc., 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1851, at *13.
230
Id. at *16.
231
Id.
232
See supra Part III.
233
See Louie, supra note 189, at 362.
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[debtor] may not assume and assign any executory contract.”234
This would make it clear that the actual test is preferred and would
allow a debtor to assume a license even if applicable law
prohibited an assignment.235
In addition to resolving the split between the actual and
hypothetical tests, a comprehensive congressional fix should
resolve the question of whether nonexclusive intellectual property
licenses are personal services contracts.236 Although most courts
do find nonexclusive patent and copyright licenses to be personal
services contracts, the lack of statutory guidance makes this
outcome somewhat unpredictable. Finally, a statutory definition of
executory contracts with specific language regarding what
obligations are sufficient to constitute a finding of an executory
contract would clear up considerable unpredictability and
ambiguity that plagues software licenses when one party files for
bankruptcy.237
B. Carefully Structure Licensing Agreements Prior to Bankruptcy
Since any type of statutory amendment would require much
time and lobbying in order to become reality, it is not a practical
solution for parties currently engaged in licensing software. For
those parties unable to wait for a statutory or judicially created fix
to the problems mentioned in this article, one solution is to
carefully structure the software license in an attempt to gain at
least some control over the outcome in the event one party to the
agreement files for bankruptcy.238
As mentioned above, simply including a clause triggering
termination of the license upon a bankruptcy filing will not work
because such provisions have no effect in bankruptcy.239 Instead,
the parties can structure the transaction as something other than a
license.240 Since a contract can escape executory treatment in
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Id. at 367 (emphasis added).
Id.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See discussion supra Part IV.
Louie, supra note 189, at 362.
See discussion supra Part IV.
Louie, supra note 189, at 362.
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bankruptcy if one or both parties have fully performed, one way to
contract around the problems listed in this Article is to create a
fully paid, nonexecutory license for the software and put any
continuing obligations, like maintenance and upgrade services in a
separate executory contract.241 In the event of a bankruptcy filing,
only the executory agreement would be subject to § 365.242 This
option will be more attractive to the licensee since a completed
transfer will result in copyright rights being swept into the
bankruptcy estate, available to the licensee’s trustee for use, sale or
lease.243 It is unclear whether § 363 provides any protection for
the licensor should this situation occur.244
A contract can also escape executory treatment if it is
terminated by one party in reaction to the other party’s material
breach prior to the bankruptcy filing.245 This option is more
attractive to the licensor than the previously mentioned “completed
transfer” option.246 In order to allow for this prebankruptcy
termination, a software license should include a provision allowing
for termination at will by either party or termination based on a
specified failure.247 Examples of such failures are nonpayment of
fees or failure of one party to meet objective performance
criteria.248 Termination clauses that include a cure right or grace
period are risky because if the other party files for bankruptcy
during a contractual grace period, the right to cure will pass to the
trustee.249 A licensor will benefit from an automatic reversion
clause, which will provide for reversion of all formally licensed or
assigned rights upon termination.250 This will ensure that a
licensee does not retain any use rights no matter which view of
rejection the court embraces when dealing with nonexclusive
licenses.251 Finally, the party who terminates a license agreement
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251

Id. at 363.
See id. at 362.
BRINSON, supra note 15, at 544–45.
Id.
Id. at 543.
See id. at 543–44.
See id. at 543.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 544–45.
Id. at 545–46.
See discussion supra Part II.C.

BISK_FORMATTED_STAFFPROOF_032307

646

3/24/2007 3:48:32 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. XVII

should obtain written acknowledgment, if possible, from the other
party to eliminate any doubt as to the status of the contract in the
event of a bankruptcy filing.
C. Carefully Designate Payments
Under § 365(n), the licensee, to retain its rights to a rejected
license, must continue to pay royalties.252 Therefore, it is
important when negotiating the license to clearly define the royalty
payments. Moreover, if other payments are due, it is important to
specify what those payments are in consideration for, such as a
maintenance or upgrade fee; “that way there is less of a risk that a
bankruptcy court will subsequently recharacterize such payments
as [continuing] royalties.”253 In order “to provide additional
incentive to the licensor to assume the license in a subsequent
bankruptcy, the licensee could try to structure the royalty payments
and other license payments to be distributed evenly over the term
of the license rather than a ‘front-end-loaded’ license.”254
D. Source Code Escrow
Software licenses often have included provisions or an entire
supplementary agreement providing for source code escrow.255
The licensor will be required to deposit the source code into a third
party escrow if certain trigger events occur.256 As mentioned
several times in this article, while it is common for the trigger
event to be insolvency or a bankruptcy filing, these provisions will
not be honored in bankruptcy.257 Even if the trigger is valid within
bankruptcy, it is probable that the reorganized debtor or trustee
will not have the knowledge or resources to assist in the transfer of

252

11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B) (2000).
Philip S. Warden, Protecting Your Rights to Intellectual Property in Bankruptcy,
PILLSBURY, WINTHROP, SHAW, PITTMAN, Dec. 1, 1999, available at http://library.
findlaw.com/1999/Sep/1/129756.html (citing Warden and Costello, New Bankruptcy
Code § 365(n): Limited Comfort for the Technology Licensee, 10 CEB CAL. BUS. L. REP.
158 (1989)).
254
Id.
255
Denson, supra note 49, at 2.
256
Id.
257
See discussion supra Part I.
253
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the software to the non-debtor.258 Therefore, in order for software
turned over to the licensee to be useful, it needs to be the most
recent version and sufficiently detailed for the licensee to use and
understand without the help of the licensor.259
In order to make a software escrow agreement worthwhile, the
trigger for a source code turnover should be based on something
other than the financial situation or bankruptcy filing of the
licensor.260 For instance, the license can include a clause that gives
the licensee the right to decide when an event triggering release
has occurred, if possible, without the required approval from the
licensor.261 Any trigger should be clearly spelled out to avoid
disagreement over whether a release has actually occurred.262
In addition, the agreement should specify as explicitly as
possible the version of the software to be turned over.263 The
licensor should have an affirmative duty under the agreement to
update and document any source code in escrow.264 This can be
guaranteed by providing in the agreement for the use of a
reputable, proven escrow agent with an adequate verification
process in place.265 This verification process gives assurances to
the licensee that the source code is being well-maintained and will
be usable, without licensor support, upon release.266 Finally, the
license should provide that the licensee can hire the licensor’s
employees who are knowledgeable about the software if the
licensor is no longer willing or able to provide assistance under the
license.267

258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267

See Denson, supra note 49, at 3–4.
Warden, supra note 253.
See discussion supra Part V.C.
Denson, supra note 53, at 15–16.
Id.
Warden, supra note 253.
Id.
Denson, supra note 53, at 16.
Id.
Warden, supra note 253.
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E. Object Early and Often in Debtor’s Attempt to Sell Property
Free and Clear
In order to prevent a Qualitech-type loss of licensee interest in
a technology license, a licensee of any licensor that files for
bankruptcy should object early and often to any motion for a free
and clear sale of the debtor’s actions and/or insist on adequate
protection from any such sale.268 In addition, any software
licensee should be alert for any notice following a bankruptcy
filing by the licensor of any of its critical software.269
F. Special Purpose Vehicles
A more complicated, but potentially quite powerful, technique
for avoiding bankruptcy-related problems is to create a bankruptcy
remote entity and transfer title to the software to this entity.270 A
bankruptcy remote entity is an entity that is ineligible for
bankruptcy and serves a special purpose, such as holding
intellectual property, with less bankruptcy risk.271 In order to carry
out this technique, the license can establish a trust which is not
eligible for bankruptcy.272 The trust then should create beneficial
interests and licenses in favor of both parties.273 The parties can,
instead, create a LLC in which they are both members.274 Finally,
the licensor can contribute the software to a special holding
subsidiary, which does not have any debt or creditors and therefore
can predictably remain solvent.275 In order to protect the licensee’s
interests completely, the parties should follow steps to make sure

268

See Zinman, supra note 120, at 160–61.
See id. at 120. Professor Alec Ostrow believes one of the problems leading to the
Qualitech decision was that Qualitech was given inadequate notice of the sale and did not
realize that its rights as a lessee were in jeopardy. Id. at 120 n.75.
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that the special purpose entity remains separate from the
licensor.276
G. Create a Security Interest
Finally, either party can take a security interest in the
license.277 The foreclosure on the security interest can occur prior
to bankruptcy if valid triggers are included in the contract.278 If the
foreclosure is completed before the other party enters bankruptcy,
the court will not reverse the foreclosure.279 In addition,
bankruptcy law respects the rights of secured creditors giving them
protections unavailable to unsecured creditors.280 Section 363
requires a trustee to “prohibit [the] . . . use, sale, or lease as is
necessary to provide adequate protection” of property on request of
the secured party.281
VI. CONCLUSION
Software licenses are generally liable to sometimes surprising
treatment when one party files for bankruptcy.282 This treatment
can be devastating to a business that relies on the software
involved, either as a primary asset or as a tool on which their
business is run.283 Since the amendment of the bankruptcy code is
unlikely in the short-term, parties to a software license should
anticipate the bankruptcy possibilities and draft their licenses
accordingly.284
Software licenses will likely be treated as executory contracts
in bankruptcy.285 Since the options given to the debtor when a
contract is found to be executory, rejection, assumption, and
assignment, may be undesirable from the perspective of the non276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

See id.
See Louie, supra note 189, at 351; Brinson, supra note 15, at 541–42.
Brinson, supra note 15, at 541–42.
Id.
Brinson, supra note 15, at 541–42. See also 11 U.S.C. § 725.
11 U.S.C.A. § 363(e) (2006).
See discussion supra Part I.D.
See discussion supra Introduction.
See discussion supra Part V.B.
See discussion supra Part I.D-E.
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bankruptcy party, parties drafting software licenses may wish to
attempt to draft their agreements in a way to avoid executory
treatment.286 In addition, parties can use various other techniques
to ensure that their rights are protected in the event of the
bankruptcy filing by the other party to the agreement.287

286
287

See discussion supra Part V.B-C.
See discussion supra Part V.D–F.

